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Hent de Vries, Minimal Theologies: Critiques oE Secular
Reason in Adorno and Levinas, trans. Geoffrey HaIe
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2005), xxxiv+720 pages.
This seminal and far-reaching volume does a great many things beyond
what it promises, wbich is to compare the thought of Theodor Adorno
and Emmanuel Levinas. In effect, it gives us a deceptively simple
rubric-"minimal theology" or "theology in pianissimo"-underwbich
what is most crucially at stake for these two philosophers, and for
many other contemporary thinkers, can be analyzed and understood.
De Vries's use of the word theology in bis rubries might at
first glance be misleading. He is not claiming, in any standard sense,
that God is at the heart of Levinas's or Adorno's enterprise. On the
contrary, this is a work about politics, ethics, and the nature of human
reason, with some forays into literary criticism. In addition to individual
and comparative analyses of the two central thinkers it contains
extensive discussion of Habermas, Derrida, and Celan. De Vries
suggests in the preface that "minimal theology" is more or less
equivalent to minimal metaphysics, and also inscribes a minimal politics
and a minimal expression-as weil, of course, as a minima moralia (xviii).
Another function of the book, therefore, is to show us that what is
sometimes called a "turn to religion" in contemporary thought is, at
the very least, not in any sense a turn away from the political or the
concrete. For in fact minimal theology is nothing less than the oscillation
between same and other--or attestation and critique-that is the
cornerstone of late 20th century philosophy: In Adorno, it manifests
itself as a dialectical critique of dialectics, in Levinas as a
phenomenological critique of phenomenology. What has been
minimized in these structures is the promise of determination that
forms the ground of attestations, of dialectical structures, of regimes,
and of the idea of God. In turn, what has a little room to be itself is
the particular---or the stranger-in all its indeterminacy.
Why talk about theology at all, then? Perhaps because it is
under the idea of God that some of the gravest metaphysical errors
have been made. Adorno and Levinas, at any rate, seem to think so,
and when they come to address those errors they appear to believe
they have to do so by setting up an alternative theology, a non-theological
theology. To see why, we have to ask what the problem with theology
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iso Looking from the bottom up, we might say, with Horkheimer, that
"solidarity with struggling, suffering human beings ... tends to make
one apathetic to metaphysical assurances" (Between Philosopf!y and Sodal
Sdence. Trans. G. F. Hunter, et. al. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, 160).
Here Horkheimer expresses the hoary problem of theodicy, the
problem of the coexistence of human sufferingand a benevolent divine.
But, looking from the top down, a more foundational problem comes
to light: metaphysical assurances, and notably theological assurances,
tend to make one apathetic to suffering human beings. This
formulation-in fact, radically different from the first-more closely
expresses the political-theological problem of the 20th century: in short,
those who are metaphysically assured are also prone to murder on a
massive scale, or to produce forms of philosophy which, more or less
wittingly, justify such murder. And while the old-fashioned theodicy
problem (in any case long since rendered a logic game in the academy)
is probably best solved with straightforward atheism, the new problem
is not so easily done away with. For suddenly it is not a matter of a
certain metaphysical assurance that we need no longer hold. It is a
problem with assurance itself: And if our assurances continue today to
provide the conceptual foundation and surreptitious legitimation of
institutions and political practices, the political task of the moment
presents itself as a rethinking of the nature of metaphysics and of
theology.
How do we do this? It is not enough to say that after the
events of the 20th century, there can be no more appeal to metaphysical
(or social) norms. This position by itself is relativism, and is as
irresponsible as the absolutist opposite. Levinas, at one point, discusses
a passage from Vasily Grossman's Iift and Fate in which we are told
that an idea of the Good is the problem; up against it, however, is not
set a relativism, but the multiplicity of kindnesses human beings do
for each other every day. But if we are to follow the thought through,
we must ask about the source of these kindnesses, and how it is we
recognize them for what they are. Both Levinas and Adorno speak of
such acts as responses to a trace-but a trace of what? And how can
this question be answered without reverting to the metaphysical
assurance offered by the Good? This, according to de Vries, is the
aporia at the heart of their thought. It is perhaps most briefly expressed
in the line de Vries defines as the central insight of Minima Moralia:
"Unrestricted goodness becomes confirmation of all the bad that exits,
in that it downplays its difference from the trace of the good" (555).
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Tbis is one way of describing the beginning of the task, wbich
is nothing less than the rejection of the binaries foundational to
traditional philosophy and theolog~ It is not the case, for Adorno and
Levinas, that the opposite of the Good is an absence of goodness, or
that the opposite of Being is nothingness; it is not even the case that
the opposite of intentional reason is folly. We seek, in Levinas's terms,
an "otherwise" to the normative claims of moral, ontological, and
epistemological thought. One of de Vries most useful analyses concerns
the way Adorno and Levinas reject a philosophy of unhappy
consciousness in favour of a 'philosophy of bad conscience. Unhappy
consciousness seeks happiness; it seeks its solution. Bad conscience
cannot, in conscience, seek solution. Another description of minimal
theology therefore might be a wounded metaphysics, one that remains
aware of its scars and refuses cosmetic surgery, a vigilance that denies
that the best address of insomnia is sleep, or of anxiety is heartsease.
In bis opening pages de Vries throws us into an account of
Habermas's attempts to find a non-polar philosopbical ground in the
wake of the death of metaphysics, God, and the author. Habermas's
search for a reason that was neither objective nor subjective led
eventually to a theory of communicative action that he strenuously
kept distant from metaphysical sanctions; in this way he laid the ground
for the statement of the aporia that concerns de Vries. Perhaps bis
main blind spot was that he refused to recognize it as an aporia. In bis
conception of communicative rationality; as in bis politics, questions
of difference are problems that should and can be worked out-the
insight that the urge to work things out is the source of the problem in
the first place is missing. Habermas thus gives us a route into an
examination of Adorno, and yet ultimately he misunderstands him.
Adorno's negative dialectics, which preserves critique as its final
movement, remained in Habermas's view insufficient. But for Adorno,
and later for Levinas, this insufficiency was the only expression of the
truth. For though the truth lies in the critique, the critique only exists
as a breach in the assertion. This curious, even tragic mode of existence
is described by de Vries as a tertium datur. With this formulation, a
denial of the logical principle of coherence, tertium non datur (p or ""'p),
de Vries works with negative dialectics, seeking to make the radicality
of the position clear.
Minimal Theologies includes a great deal of detailed work
unraveling the philosophies of Levinas, Adorno, and Habermas. Many
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parallels between the them are expounded and the comparison is
facilitated at times with thinkers such as Blanchot, and at times with
lesser known figures such as Schnädelbach. Straightforward issues that
might seem to a novice inescapably to divide Levinas and Adorno are
laid to rest. The notion, for instance, that Adorno is primarily a
philosopher of autonomyis dealt with thoroughly; Adorno's autonomy
represents the first movement toward responsibility, and, from a broader
perspective, is a function of the drive to responsibility awoken by the
suffering other-as it is in Levinas. That de Vries performs this exercise
might suggest that his main method of comparison involves finding
parallels in Adorno's social psychology to aspects of Levinas's ethical
encounter. In fact he does not take this route, which also seems to me
for various reasons unfruitful. Instead, the main thrust of the book's
comparative analysis entails discerning a non-dialectical dialectics in
Levinas, a structure of alternation between the cleaving extremes, ily a
and i/lei!). The discussion of these structures as parallel, as weil as simply
in opposition, is, from the perspective of a Levinasian, quite bold. It
requires some formalization of the structures, and de Vries also
considers Derrida's further formalizationinMarginsoj Phi/osopkJ, Writing
and Difference, and elsewhere, which permits extensive exploration of
the alternatives from the perspective of dijftrance.
Both Levinas and Adorno have been accused at various times
of negativi~Levinasians tend to claim that Adorno cannot fill in the
positive content implied at the heart of his critique; critical theorists,
and other politically-minded scholars, tend to claim that Levinas has
no politics, since all he can do is show us what is wrong with totalities.
One of the things de Vries draws out is the positive nature of critique
itself; the promise of positive assertions is replaced by the promise,
albeit minimal, on which the critique rests. The atrophied hope that
remains after this reduction is profoundly paradoxieal, since it is a hope
that arises from the unqualified rejection of expectation. Adorno comes
to his position on hope gradually, defining his ideas against Horkheimer's
pessimism and Benjamin's utopianism. Eventually he sums the position
up with the statement that "even to think hope forsakes hope and
works against it," and draws the uncomfortable conclusion for theology
that "one who believes in God therefore cannot believe in Hirn" (610).
In a similar vein, Levinas writes that "prophecy and ethics in no way
exclude the consolations of religion, but ... only a humanity which
can do without these consolations perhaps may be worthy of them"
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(533). A hope that arises from a lack of hope, a propheey from a lack
of religion: this impossible thought is the onlyway to think God without
adverse effects, and, for me, it is the profound core at the heart of de
Vries's book.
This brings me to the only topic on which I wish to pose to
de Vries a critical question concerning the relation between minimal
theology and theology proper. De Vries argues that the roots of
Habermas's search for an 'other' reason are found in his reading of
traditional theology. He argues further that the theologieal rhetoric
that crops up frequently in Habermas's ostensibly secular corpus is a
flag hinring at an allegiance to aporia in an otherwise systematic body
of thought. This suggests that minimal theology might have, in fact, a
good deal to do with traditional theology. Nevertheless, de Vries insists
that in Adorno and Levinas, we are dealing neither with the residue of
an early confessional allegiance nor with a more or less cloaked religious
sensibility. Indeed, minimal theology is, as de Vries insists at various
points, not theology at all (cE 594). But, given his analysis of Habermas's
theological reading, I believe we can raise certain questions about
Adorno and Levinas, and particularly about their Jewishness.
De Vries declares himself "critical" of "attempts to
appropriate Levinas within the context of Jewish philosophy" (xix).
He explains this by pointing out that "for allJewish, Christian, or Islamic
theology, as for every concrete, particular answer to the 'question of
meaning,' there must per definitionem emerge a moment at which the
process of argumentation comes to an end" (153). Thus, whatever
Levinas is when he is at home, de Vries argues that at work he is a
philosopher, and that "religious tradition cannot weigh decisively in an
evaluation of the contribution of his figures of thought to a minimal
theology" (351). No~ what de Vries says about Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam is precisely what Levinas often says about theology. The
problem is that for Levinas,Judaism is nota tl'leology; rather, as he puts
it in his first recorded statement to the Colloque des intelleduels juifs in
1957, it is a way of comprehending reality such that the interpersonal
is valued above all else. What he means is that Judaism is a thought
about ethics; it is open to ideas of faith and salvation only insofar as
they are ethically inscribed; and it points to a way of life in which there
does notemerge a momentwhen questioning comes to an end. Levinas
might weil be wrong about Judaism, but in this context his statement
cannot be dismissed. For if this is what he really thinks, then he has no
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reason to leave his religion at horne when he comes to work. I would
in fact go so far as ask whether, for Levinas, the movements de Vries
describes as minimal theology are not the defining moves of theJewish
tradition. And perhaps a similar argument could be made aboutAdorno,
though I am not yet in a position to make it. I sense that it would have
to rest not on the famous messianie moment at the end of Minima
Moralia, but on the argument de Vries himself makes in chapter 12
that the prohibition of graven images is the root of negative dialectics.
The critique to which the book is most susceptible is not
actually a critique of the book at all, but of the ideas expounded. Once
the oscillation that defines Levinas's and Adorno's thought-and indeed
our current philosophical condition-has been defined so clearly, the
reader finds herself asking whether the little bit of promise left in a
minimal theology is not like being a little bit pregnant. To be sure, it iso
The trick is to keep it this way, rather than letting it grow into theism or
resorting to terminal atheism. To keep one's theology at the state of
"not yet" requires continual care, and, as the analogy suggests, a certain
amount of philosophical violence. Yet, as a student of Levinas's work,
I find myself seeking the moments where diachrony seems to take us
beyond the oscillation between transcendence and immanence, into
an otherwise that being that is not tormented or difficult. The otherwise
than being is not the romantic play space of art or text that some have
seen in it, nor, I think, is it merely the unreachable purity lying on the
other side of the quotidian compromise that repeats and compounds
the philosophical problem of dirty hands. For me, this speculation or
longing has been sharpened and clarified by de Vries's superb volume.
Oona Eisenstadt
Pomona College
PeterJonkers and Ruud Welten, eds., God In France: Eight
Contemporary French Thinkers on God, (Leuven: Peeters,
2005), 227 pages.
With the publication of Le tournant theologique de laphenomenologiefranraise
in 1991, Dominique Janicaud decidedly brought to the forefront of
contemporary continental philosophy a debate concerning the
relationship between phenomenology and theology. Janicaud's weil
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